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Abstract
We investigate the trade-o⁄ between employment and labour productivity in a
panel of OECD countries in 1970-2003. The endogeneity of employment is shown to
matter crucially for assessing its e⁄ect on productivity. Estimating a structural model
with 3SLS, where employment depends on demographic variables and labour market
institutions, we ￿nd that employment tends to boost productivity. Literature ignoring
the endogeneity of employment, including our own OLS results, incorrectly ￿nds a
negative or insigni￿cant e⁄ect from employment on productivity. The productivity
gain is, however, not a guaranteed by-product of additional employment, as regressions
with rolling windows reveal.
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11 Introduction
The key objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of employment on labour
productivity in the long run. The cyclical ￿ uctuations have been extensively investigated,
with mixed results. At the other extreme, Kremer (1993) argues that through most of
history, pointing at the very long run, the growth rate of world population is positively
related to improvements in technology: societies with greater initial population attained
higher technology levels and population densities. Our focus is on the time span of decades,
rather than quarters or centuries, which we take as the long run. Our main research
question is: does an increase in employment, in participation or in hours per worker,
a⁄ect productivity in the long run?
The relevance of our research is twofold. First, countries can raise production by
working more and/or more e¢ ciently. Does one element go at the expense of the other?
The United States￿record is quite good in both respects: it combines a high participation
rate and long working hours with high productivity levels ￿at least in comparison with the
West-European countries. Countries like Ireland, France and the Netherlands outperform
the US in terms of hourly productivity, but lag behind in terms of labour e⁄ort (Ederveen
et al., 2007). Other countries like Japan, Switzerland and many central-European countries
work more, but less e¢ ciently than the US.1 Would these countries be able to increase
their productivity by cutting employment? And, will West-European countries be able to
raise their labour e⁄ort without deteriorating their productivity?
Secondly, our main question is at the heart of the Lisbon agenda, which intends to
raise both employment (jobs) and productivity (growth). Clearly, the European Union
has the objective (though likely with a long-run vision) of becoming the most competitive
economy in the world in 2010, in terms of both productivity and employment. Again, a
pressing question is whether there is a trade-o⁄ between both objectives in the long run.
Several studies relate the long-run development of productivity (over a period of 10
years or more) to employment. To start with a very long sample, Greasley and Madsen
(2006) have a 135-year sample (1870-2005) in which they observe a stable relationship
between the levels of employment and productivity, with an elasticity of ￿0:4. Several
studies investigate the post-war period. Beaudry and Collard (2002) use cross-country
regressions relating the change in output-per-worker (over 15 of 25 year periods) to the
change in employment and the initial level of output-per-worker. Using a panel of 18
OECD countries for the period 1960-1997, they ￿nd that the change in employment results
1The United States outperforms many other OECD countries in both respects: both productivity per
hour and hours worked per capita are higher in the US.
2in a large and systematic reduction of labour productivity. They extend their analysis to
both developed and developing countries in Beaudry et al. (2004) with similar results.
The same estimation methodology is used by Cavelaars (2005), but instead he uses 10-
year rolling windows for all OECD countries from 1960 to 2000. He ￿nds a negative
impact of employment on labour productivity for the period 1961-1980, but the trade-o⁄
disappears in the period 1980-2000. The European Commission (2007) uses the same
methodology, but for a sample period of 1960 to 2000 for EU15 Member States. They ￿nd
a negative relation throughout the whole sample period. However, after 1980 the trade-o⁄
is less pronounced, but stable.
A critical weakness of the previous studies is the lack of attention to the endogene-
ity of employment. Only the study of Beaudry and Collard (2002) explicitly deals with
endogeneity by instrumenting employment with active population. However, the broader
theoretical and empirical literature clearly points at a bi-causal relationship between em-
ployment and productivity ￿both in the short run and in the long run. In the short
run, employment will a⁄ect productivity if capital adjusts slowly while higher productiv-
ity may make labour temporarily redundant.2 In the long run, higher productivity will
raise wages which likely raises the supply of labour. The opposite causal direction cannot
be excluded either. It clearly does not exist in a standard Solow growth model, where
total factor productivity is determined exogenously in the long run. However, even in a
Solow-context, employment shocks may a⁄ect total factor productivity on average if an
employment shock a⁄ects the composition of the labour force: additional labour might
be highly educated, but less experienced; and working more hours per week may only
add less productive hours. Moreover, endogenous growth models show that productivity
might bene￿t from economies of scale (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Bottazzi and Peri, 2007).
These arguments show that two-way causality cannot be excluded in advance, not even in
2The debate about the short-run impact of employment on productivity is unresolved. First, it is
unclear whether employment and productivity are positively (Canova et al., 2007, 2008) or negatively
related (Gali, 1999; Dedola and Neri, 2007). Second, it is unresolved whether the causality runs from
productivity to employment or vice versa. Both real business cycle (RBC) models and new Keynesian
models investigate the impact of exogenous technology shocks on employment. RBC models point at a
positive relation, which they explain by standard neoclassical economics. New Keynesian economics explain
a negative relation by introducing price rigidities. These literatures do not discuss the reverse e⁄ect of
employment on productivity. Recently, Denis et al. (2005) apply the structural VAR methodology (similar
to Gali, 1999)) to identify employment shocks with long-run identi￿cation restrictions. In a sample of
Euro area countries in the period 1995-2003 they show that an employment shock has a negative impact
on productivity in the short run. By regression productivity growth on employment growth in a panel of
25 OECD countries in 1992-2000, Belorgey et al. (2004) ￿nd that employment has an elasticity of about
￿0:4 on labour productivity. A similar short-run is estimated by BourlŁs and Cette (2005).
3the long run.
We take the endogeneity of employment into account by including both demographic
variables (like Beaudry and Collard, 2002) and labour market institutions as instruments
for employment and hours per worker. The single paper which similarly copes with the
endogeneity of employment, though in a short-run growth setting, is Dew-Becker and
Gordon (2008). This paper shows that employment growth (instrumented with the tax
wedge, the degree of corporatism and union density) tends to reduce productivity growth
with an elasticity of about ￿0:6.
We show that the endogeneity of employment matters crucially for the results. Estimat-
ing a structural model with 3SLS, where employment depends on demographic variables
and labour market institutions, we ￿nd that employment tends to boost productivity.
This contrasts with the existing literature and with our own OLS results where a negative
though insigni￿cant elasticity is estimated. Regressions with rolling windows reveal, how-
ever, that the employment-productivity relation is unstable. This relation of productivity
to total hours is re￿ned to the intensive and extensive margin of employment. We show
that the extensive margin of employment tends to boost productivity. The elasticity to
hours per worker cannot, however, be precisely estimated.
In section 2, we setup a structural model on the link between employment and produc-
tivity and motivate the choice for demographic variables and labour market institutions
to instrument employment. Section 3 regresses labour productivity on total hours and on
the intensive and extensive margin separately. Section 4 concludes.
2 Structural approach using a system of equations
2.1 Theoretical framework
We setup the theoretical model which will be estimated with a panel of OECD-countries.
We ￿rst relate labour productivity to total hours worked, which is subsequently sepa-
rated/divided into the intensive margin (hours per worker) and the extensive margin (per-
sons employed). Employment, in turn, will be regressed on productivity, labour market
institutions and demographic variables.
Consider a production function in labour and capital with constant returns to scale
(CRS), which can be written in intensive form as y = Af(k), where y ￿ Y
H denotes
production (Y ) per hour (H), k ￿ K
H is capital (K) per hour and A measures productivity.
This production function can be linearised to:
lnyct = lnAct + ￿ct lnkct (1)
4where c indexes countries and t indexes years.
There is an endogenous relationship between labour productivity and capital. To avoid
this problem in our regressions, we ￿x the capital-income share ￿ for each country.3 In
addition, we decompose lnAct = ln
￿
Ac0(1 + g)t￿
= lnAc0 + gct, where gc is the country-
speci￿c trend rate of TFP growth.4 We can now rewrite (1) as:
lnyct = ￿c0 + ￿c1t + c ￿c lnkct; (2)
where ￿c0 and ￿c1 are the estimated values for lnAc0 and gc, respectively.
Our empirical strategy consists of including an extra term in equation (2) to account for
the possible e⁄ect of extra employment (measured as total hours) on labour productivity.
Therefore, the equation to be estimated is:
lnyct = c ￿c lnkct + ￿c0 + ￿c1t + ￿ lnHct + "ct (3)
H0 : ￿ = 0
H1 : ￿ 6= 0
The null hypothesis is that total hours does not a⁄ect capital-adjusted labour productivity
(lnyt ￿ b ￿lnkt), as follows from the Solow growth model, while the alternative hypothesis
states that hours worked does a⁄ect productivity.
In the extension of the model, we distinguish the extensive and intensive margins of
employment, namely persons employed (L) and hours per worker (h), such that H = hL.
Substituting in (3) and allowing for the productivity e⁄ects of h and L to be di⁄erent, i.e.
￿1 6= ￿2, then we estimate:5
lnyct = c ￿c lnkct + ￿c0 + ￿c1t + ￿1 lnhct + ￿2 lnLct + "ct (4)
H0 : ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 0
H1 : ￿1 6= 0 or ￿2 6= 0
2.2 Key determinants of employment
To control for the endogeneity of total hours, we include also a labour market equation.
We assume that labour hours are determined not only by labour productivity, but also by
3These country-speci￿c capital shares are taken from Bernanke and G￿rkaynak (2001). The interpreta-
tion of ￿ as capital share strictly holds for a Cobb-Douglas production function only. Sensitivity analysis
shows, however, that the assumption about the capital shares does not drive the results.
4We found that the estimated coe¢ cients for gc have signi￿cant country variation. Moreover, there are
serial correlation problems when not including country-speci￿c time trends.
5If indeed ￿1 6= ￿2 then (3) is unnecessarily restricting the e⁄ects of h and L on labour productivity.
5labour market institutions, demography and labour taxes.
lnHct = ac0 + bc1 lnyct + ￿LM + ￿D + "ct (5)
where LM is a matrix of labour taxes and labour market institution variables (i.e. union
density, employment protection, unemployment bene￿t duration, average replacement
rate, collective bargaining coverage). D is a matrix of demographic variables (i.e. the
population share for two age groups: 15-49 and 50-64, and the dependency ratio). The
corresponding coe¢ cients are vectors ￿ and ￿.
There is no need to argue that employment depends on demographic variables. In the
context of the employment-productivity relation, few papers take this dependence into
account. In a series of papers, Beaudry and Collard (2002) and Beaudry et al. (2004, 2005)
use population growth to avoid the endogeneity problem. Their empirical strategy is based
on a technological change being present. Beaudry et al. (2005) argue that around 1995
structural change took place. Thus, the relationship they found could be time-speci￿c and
may have changed after 1995. These papers show a strong co-movement between output-
per-worker and labour variables (population, labour force and employment), suggesting
that demographics variables have both a strong e⁄ect on employment and productivity.
Other studies incorporate demographic variables into the analyses of the employment-
productivity relationship. Feyrer (2007) argues that demographic di⁄erences explain much
of the cross-country variation in economic performance between rich and poor countries.
He estimates the impact of demographics on productivity in a panel for 87 countries in the
period 1960-1990. Arguing that people at mid-ages have the highest productivity levels,
he ￿nds that a 5% increase in the size of the cohort of 40 to 49 years, over a ten-year
period, results in an increase in productivity growth between 1% to 2% in each year of the
decade. Since demographic variables directly a⁄ect labour supply, these studies provide
an indirect channel between employment and productivity.
Labour market reforms can a⁄ect the employment-productivity link in several ways.
These reforms are aimed at increasing employment, but can also a⁄ect labour productiv-
ity. The e⁄ect can run indirectly through the expected increase in employment, but also
directly (i.e., better functioning labour markets may induce productivity improvements).
Given the diversity of labour market institutions that can be reformed (e.g. EPL, labour
taxes, unemployment bene￿ts, minimum wages, collective wage bargaining), there are
several complex channels through which the reforms can a⁄ect the relationship between
employment and labour productivity.
The European Commission (2007) details the theoretical functioning of several of these
mechanisms through which labour (and product) market reforms interact with the em-
ployment and productivity relationship. There are many empirical papers that analyse the
6e⁄ect of labour market institutions on employment6, but only a subset of this literature
also deals with the e⁄ects on productivity. Allard and Lindert (2006), Bassanini and Venn
(2007) and OECD (2007) estimate the e⁄ect of several labour market policies on labour
productivity: policies like minimum wages and parental leave tend to raise productivity,
labour taxes and protectionist labour market institutions tend to be harmful, but several
other labour market policies do not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect. The e⁄ect of employment
protection is supported by Autor et al. (2007), who ￿nd tentative evidence that employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) increases labour productivity but reduces TFP in the
US. For a panel of OECD countries, Belot et al. (2007) show that there exists an inverse
U-shape relationship between employment protection and economic growth.7
There is no way to summarize brie￿ y such a complex and rich literature. However, it is
clear that the possible trade-o⁄between employment and productivity is highly dependent
on the country-speci￿c labour market institutions.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Data
We use a sample of 15 countries: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Germany (DEU),
Denmark, (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR),
Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Swe-
den (SWE), and the United States (USA) for the period 1970-2003. Annual data on
employment, capital stocks and labour market indicators are taken from the OECD, while
demographic values are from United Nations.8
In Appendix A we plot the series of labour productivity, total hours, employed workers
and hours per worker. It is interesting to note that for all countries labour productivity
is increasing in our sample period, while hours per worker is decreasing. The trend in
persons employed di⁄ers over countries and it is not monotonic, and thus, total hours has
also a country-speci￿c trend.
We estimate the system of equations for total hours given by equations (3) and (5). We
deliberately choose to estimate both equations in levels, as ￿rst-di⁄erencing would remove
6For instance, Bassanini and Duval (2006) assess the impact of several labour market indicators for
OECD countries in the last decade. They ￿nd robust relations between di⁄erent labour market policies
and employment.
7Cahuc and Koeniger (2007) summarize the articles of the Economic Journal issue that deals with EPL.
Also see the OECD (2004) for an overview of the e⁄ects of EPL on labour market performance.
8See Appendix B for the de￿nition of the variables and the speci￿c sources.
7Table 1: Average growth rates of main variables for two sample periods
Labour Total Employment Hours
productivity hours per worker
70-86 87-03 70-86 87-03 70-86 87-03 70-86 87-03
Austria AUT 3.4% 2.0% 0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 0.9% ￿ 0.2% ￿ 0.2%
Belgium BEL 3.9% 1.5% ￿ 1.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.8% ￿ 1.1% ￿ 0.1%
Germany DEU 3.0% 2.2% ￿ 0.4% ￿ 0.3% 0.7% 0.6% ￿ 1.1% ￿ 0.8%
Denmark DNK 3.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.3% ￿ 0.9% ￿ 0.2%
Spain ESP 3.3% 1.2% ￿ 0.1% 2.7% 0.1% 3.0% ￿ 0.3% ￿ 0.3%
Finland FIN 3.6% 2.7% 0.6% ￿ 0.1% 1.1% 0.0% ￿ 0.7% ￿ 0.2%
France FRA 3.8% 2.0% ￿ 0.2% 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% ￿ 1.2% ￿ 0.7%
United Kingdom GBR 1.7% 2.1% ￿ 0.7% 0.5% ￿ 0.4% 0.8% ￿ 0.2% ￿ 0.3%
Ireland IRL 3.6% 4.2% 0.1% 2.7% 0.9% 3.4% ￿ 0.8% ￿ 0.7%
Italy ITA 2.4% 1.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 0.1% ￿ 0.4%
Japan JPN 4.4% 2.6% 1.3% 0.1% 1.7% 0.9% ￿ 0.4% ￿ 0.7%
Netherlands NLD 3.4% 1.1% ￿ 0.5% 1.6% 0.8% 2.0% ￿ 1.3% ￿ 0.4%
Portugal PRT 3.4% 3.3% ￿ 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% ￿ 0.4% ￿ 0.5%
Sweden SWE 1.5% 2.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% ￿ 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
United States USA 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.3% 1.9% 1.4% ￿ 0.4% ￿ 0.1%
meana 3.1% 2.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.8% 1.1% ￿ 0.6% ￿ 0.4%
a Mean is the unweighted average of the growth rates of each variable.
8the information on long-run behaviour which we are interested in.9
To cope with the endogeneity of employment, we apply three stage least squares
(3SLS).10 This method allows for endogenous variables to be among the explanatory vari-
ables in some of the structural equations. It also corrects for the correlation between the
disturbance terms and the endogenous variables, as well as for the correlation between the
disturbances among equations. We will compare these system estimates with OLS, which
given the endogeneity problem will likely produce biased coe¢ cient estimates.
We test for multicollinearity among the exogenous demographic and institutional vari-
ables. We select variables which are su¢ ciently uncorrelated (with correlation < 0:7).
Moreover, we excluded variables with insu¢ cient time variation (like employment protec-
tion and union coverage). The instrumental variables used are: the population share of
the 50-64 age group (ag_50_64), the dependency ratio (dep_ratio), trade union density
(undens), the average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate (arr) and the total labour
tax revenue as a proportion of GDP (totlabtax).
The sample period is from 1970 to 2003 (34 annual observations in 15 countries), but
following the results from the literature we do not expect that the coe¢ cients are stable
for the whole sample. For example, Beaudry et al. (2005) and Cavelaars (2005) found a
structural change around 1980 in the relationship between employment growth and labour
productivity growth. To check the previous results, we use Chow tests for structural breaks
in 1980 and 1990, which rejects the hypothesis of stable coe¢ cients.11 Figure 1 visualises
the instability of the elasticity of total hours in equation (3), where we run regressions
using a rolling 15-year sample to check the stability of the coe¢ cients. An increase in
total hours tend to raise productivity, but the elasticity ￿ uctuates between 0.05 and 0.7
and is not always signi￿cant.
The positive coe¢ cient from employment in the productivity equation rejects a clear
9The stationarity of the residuals indicates whether or not the estimated relation between employment
and productivity is stable. However, the instability of the regressions result makes these cointegration tests
redundant.
10See StataCorp (2007) for the application of 3SLS in Stata. Given the short samples we deal with in the
rolling windows, we apply 3SLS with small-sample statistics correction as standard 3SLS would produce
too small standard errors.
11To compute the Chow statistic we use the residual sum of squares (rss) of equation (3) for each







where k is the number of parameters in equation (3), N1 and N2, are the number of observations in each
sub-sample. Ch is distributed as F(k;N1 + N2 ￿ 2k).
9Figure 1: Elasticity of productivity to total hours (parameter and 10% con￿dence interval,
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trade-o⁄ between employment and productivity. For the whole period employment and
productivity go hand in hand, which we explain from changes in the composition of the
labour force. An expansion of employment will stimulate productivity if additional work-
ers are more productive than those leaving the labour market. The introduction of the
new general purpose technology (ICT) in the eighties might have temporarily diminished
the productivity margin of new workers, who had to spend time in learning and adoption
rather than in productive work, as is also suggested by Beaudry et al. (2005). A likely ex-
planation for the declining coe¢ cient in recent years is the EU-wide reliance on policies to
stimulate participation, such that less productive workers left the labour market at lower
rates and inexperienced workers entered. More research is needed to support these some-
what speculative explanations for the variation in the employment-productivity relation
of Figure 1.
In our setup, we deliberately take the endogeneity of total hours into account. The
OLS-line in Figure 1 shows the empirical relevance of this approach: we would seriously
underestimate the elasticity of total hours on productivity would we ignore this endo-
geneity by estimating with ordinary least squares. In fact, the OLS estimate is generally
negative, but insigni￿cant.
10Table 2: System estimate of productivity and total hours
1970-1984 1975-1989 1980-1994 1985-1999 1990-2003
Productivity
lnH 0.679*** 0.203** 0.049 0.428*** 0.068
[0.203] [0.079] [0.054] [0.093] [0.046]
Total hours
lny -0.066** 0.028 0.054 0.276*** 0.204**
[0.032] [0.038] [0.050] [0.061] [0.086]
ag_50_64 0.001 ￿ 0.001 ￿ 0.002 ￿ 0.006 0.007
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
dep_ratio 2.636*** 2.399*** 2.045*** 0.091 -0.796***
[0.350] [0.301] [0.381] [0.352] [0.274]
undens -0.006*** 0.001 0.000 ￿ 0.000 -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
arr 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** ￿ 0.001 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
totlabtax ￿ 0.286 0.823** -1.368*** -3.114*** -2.101***
[0.296] [0.394] [0.408] [0.383] [0.410]
Observations 200 215 222 223 208
The productivity equation (3) includes country ￿xed e⁄ects, country speci￿c time trends and corrects
for capital adjustment by ￿xing country-speci￿c values for c ￿c. Standard errors are given in brackets.
11Table 2 shows for a selection of windows the estimate of both equations in the system.
Clearly, the instability is not only present in the productivity equation, but also in the
total-hours equation. Higher productivity encourages employment in recent decades, but
has tempered it in the seventies and early eighties. In early years, households may have
substituted employment for leisure (by working less hours) in response to higher income.
In recent years, higher productivity may have encouraged participation. The table also
shows that both demographic variables and labour market institutions signi￿cantly a⁄ect
total hours.
3.2 Productivity, employment and hours per worker
We investigate whether the link between employment and productivity can be contributed
to the intensive or extensive margin. A ￿rst indication of the results is already provided
by the raw data analysis (see Table 4), which point at the fact that total hours is highly
positively correlated with the number of persons employed, but less with hours per worker.
We therefore run the 3SLS for the system of equations for separated persons employed
and hours per worker, as presented in Table 3.12
The ambiguity in the total-hours estimates, on the causality from productivity to
employment, is partly resolved in Table 3. The table con￿rms that productivity stimulates
participation, but depresses hours per worker (in favour of leisure). The table cannot prove
that the latter e⁄ect dominates in the seventies whereas the participation e⁄ect drives the
elasticities in more recent decades.
The intensive and extensive margin of employment a⁄ect productivity di⁄erently, i.e.
￿1 6= ￿2 in equation (4). Figure 2 shows that the elasticity of productivity to total hours
is closely related to the employment elasticity. Implausible, however, are the size and
the ￿ uctuation of the elasticity of the intensive margin, which ￿ uctuates between ￿2 and
+2. For example, an elasticity of ￿2 would imply that total production declines by 1% if
hours per worker expands by 1%. Moreover, a reduction in the estimated elasticity of 4
percentage points, by rolling the window with 2 years is implausible.13
12The labour market equation is split into:
lnhct = ahc + bhc lny + ￿hLM + ￿hD + "hct (7)
lnLct = aLc + bLc lny + ￿LLM + ￿LD + "Lct (8)
The system of equations is now given by (4), (7) and (8).
13We checked whether this result is due to an outlier (or data problem) in a single country, by eliminating
each country from the system (one by one, such that we repeatedly regress the rolling window for fourteen
countries). This does not resolve the ￿ uctuation in the elasticity of productivity to hours per worker.
12Table 3: System estimate of productivity, employment and hours per worker
1970-1984 1975-1989 1980-1994 1985-1999 1990-2003
Productivity
ln_emp 1.022*** 0.162 0.299*** 0.433*** -0.112*
[0.162] [0.136] [0.086] [0.148] [0.060]
ln_h_worker -0.690* 0.411 -2.011*** ￿ 0.598 -1.887***
[0.377] [0.351] [0.512] [0.755] [0.331]
Employment (persons)
ln_labpty 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.322*** 0.300***
[0.026] [0.037] [0.053] [0.063] [0.087]
ag_50_64 -0.008* ￿ 0.001 0.009* ￿ 0.000 0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
dep_ratio 1.556*** 1.366*** 2.065*** 0.858** ￿ 0.168
[0.281] [0.296] [0.402] [0.365] [0.277]
undens -0.006*** 0.001 0.000 ￿ 0.002 -0.012***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
arr 0.003*** -0.002** -0.006*** -0.002* 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
totlabtax ￿ 0.147 1.246*** -1.077** -3.103*** -2.517***
[0.236] [0.386] [0.427] [0.396] [0.417]
Hours per worker
ln_labpty -0.279*** -0.168*** -0.120*** -0.038** -0.103***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.023]
ag_50_64 0.011*** 0.000 -0.010*** ￿ 0.002 0.004***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
dep_ratio 1.025*** 0.940*** ￿ 0.110 -0.804*** -0.480***
[0.147] [0.121] [0.131] [0.097] [0.073]
undens 0.000 ￿ 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
arr ￿ 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 ￿ 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
totlabtax ￿ 0.140 -0.531*** -0.285** 0.071 0.365***
[0.124] [0.159] [0.136] [0.108] [0.104]
Observations 200 215 222 223 208
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The key ￿ndings of this empirical analysis are that one should take the endogeneity
of employment seriously and that the relation between employment and productivity is
quite unstable, but tends to be positive.
Both ￿ndings do not critically depend on the country-sample, as the exclusion of one or
another country in our sample does not qualitatively a⁄ect our conclusions. Even splitting
the sample in two sub samples, for example by taking the Anglo-Saxon countries out,
does not change our results: total hours and employment tend to raise productivity to a
varying and sometimes insigni￿cant degree, and the elasticity to hours per worker is highly
unstable. Moreover, the results are robust to a change in the selection of demographic
and institutional variables as well as to estimations where the capital-elasticity is uniform
instead of country-speci￿c.
4 Conclusion
Labour productivity and employment are interrelated: productivity depends on employ-
ment which in turn is in￿ uenced by productivity. The regression analysis shows that this
two-way relationship matters signi￿cantly for the estimation of the impact of employment
on productivity per hour. When a system of equations is estimated, we ￿nd that em-
14ployment tends to boost productivity, which contrasts the OLS results where a negative
though insigni￿cant elasticity is estimated. This ￿nding seriously questions the existing
literature on the trade-o⁄ between employment and productivity, which generally ignores
the endogeneity of employment.
Our estimates con￿rm the ￿nding in the literature that the relation between employ-
ment and productivity is unstable. Using 15-year rolling windows, the estimated elasticity
varies between 0.7 in the 1970-1984 window and 0.1 (and insigni￿cant) in the 1990-2003
window. This may be contributed to the dependency ratio, which is rising in all countries.
The source of (young and) highly educated starters on the labour market, which initially
has contributed to both employment and productivity, is gradually drying up.
Finally, the impact from total hours worked cannot be meaningfully split into the in-
￿ uence of more persons or more hours per worker. The employment elasticity is reasonable
and largely in line with the total-hours elasticity, but the elasticity to hours per worker
cannot be precisely estimated.
Stimulating employment may or may not con￿ ict with productivity targets. We show
in this paper that productivity responses may be expected, but show that these responses
are unstable and depend on the intensive and extensive margin of employment. The risk
of a productivity slowdown seems to be stronger with stimulating hours per worker than
with targeting on participation.
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17A Figures of yearly data
Figure 3: Yearly data, United States
18Figure 4: Yearly data, Japan and Italy
19Figure 5: Yearly data, UK and Ireland
20Figure 6: Yearly data, Germany and France
21Figure 7: Yearly data, Spain and Portugal
22Figure 8: Yearly data, Belgium and the Netherlands
23Figure 9: Yearly data, Austria and Denmark
24Figure 10: Yearly data, Finland and Sweden
25Table 4: Correlation and unit root in productivity and employment-variables
Correlation and unit root
lny lnH lnL lnh
lny 1.00
lnH 0.12 1.00
lnL 0.17 1.00 1.00
lnh ￿ 0.71 0.15 0.07 1.00
Common unit root processa
levels ￿ 4.61 ￿ 0.06 ￿ 0.15 ￿ 1.93
(0.00) (0.48) (0.44) (0.03)
￿rst di⁄erence ￿ 13.14 ￿ 7.47 ￿ 9.24 ￿ 13.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Individual unit root process
levels ￿ 0.95 ￿ 0.82 ￿ 0.06 ￿ 0.72
(0.17) (0.21) (0.48) (0.24)
￿rst di⁄erence ￿ 12.12 ￿ 7.79 ￿ 9.79 ￿ 13.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
We applied the panel unit root tests of Im et al. (2003) and Levin et al. (2002).
p-values are in parenthesis.
26B De￿nition of exogenous variables used in the system of
equations
￿ AG_15_49 : Population share of the age group from 15 to 49 years. Source UN
(2004).
￿ AG_50_64 : Population share of the age group from 50 to 64 years. Source UN
(2004).
￿ DEP_RATIO : The ratio of the inactive population (older than 65 years) to the
active population (15 to 64 years). Source UN (2004).
￿ TOTLABTAX : Total labour tax revenue as a proportion of GDP. We construct
this variable using the revenue for Social Security Contributions and Taxes on Payroll
and Workforce as a proportion of GDP taken in local currency. Source: OECDstat.
￿ LABWEDGE : The labour tax wedge, which is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between
the labour cost paid by the employer and the net take-home pay of the employee.
These data is taken for a single-earner couple with two children earning 100% of
average production workers earnings. It takes the combined central and sub-central
government income tax plus employee and employer social security contribution
taxes (also including cash transfers); as a percentage of labour costs de￿ned as gross
wage earnings plus employer social security contributions (also including employer
payroll taxes). Source: OECD,Taxing Wages.
￿ EPL : OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Leg-
islation. Source: OECD (2004).
￿ ARR : Average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate. De￿ned as the average un-
employment bene￿t replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% of
the average production worker APW earnings), three family situations (single, with
dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three di⁄erent unemployment dura-
tions (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, and 4th and 5th years of unemployment).Source:
OECD, Bene￿ts and Wages Database.
￿ UBENDUR : Unemployment bene￿t duration, which is de￿ned as the ratio of
average to initial unemployment bene￿t replacement rate. Source: OECD (2004).
￿ UNDENS : Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers a¢ liated to a trade
union, in percentages. Source: OECD (2004).
27￿ UNCOV CM : collective bargaining coverage rate, de￿ned as the share of workers
covered by a collective agreement. Source OECD (2004).
28